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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY PARKER, Administratix 
of the estate of Katie C. Johnson, etc. 
deceased. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his wife, 
et al. 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 7401 
Brief of Appellant 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
Judge. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY PARKER, Administratix 
of the estate of Katie C. Johnson, etc. 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his wife, 
et al. 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7401 
Appellant appeals from an order and judgment entered 
by the district court of Salt Lake County, Utah, dismissing 
appellant's complaint with prejudice and upon the merits 
thereof. (R. 45). 
It is shown by the allegations of appellant's complaint 
that Katie C. Johnson was the owner of the fee title to the 
real property affected by this action. That the property was 
sold for general property taxes for the year 1924 and that 
Auditor's Deed issued thereon in 1929. That thereafter Salt 
Lake County issued a quitclaim deed covering said property 
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to one, Alton F. Lund who thereafter on January 7, 1946 
conveyed the property to defendants and respondents S. R. 
Ross and Edith Ross, his wife. That S. R. Ross and Edith 
Ross, his wife filed quiet title action in the district court of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, naming Katie C. Johnson as defend-
ant in said action. That service of process was had on 
Katie C. Johnson in said action by publication and decree 
quieting title in S. R. Ross and Edith Ross, his wife, was 
entered upon the default of Katie C. Johnson, on June 13th, 
1946. 
By appellant's second amended complaint, appellant 
adopted and made a part of her second amended complaint, 
the affidavit upon which the orded for publication of sum-
mons was predicated ( R. 34) which affidavit is attached to 
and made a part of appellant's first amended complaint 
(R. 20, 21, 22) by which it is evident that said action to 
quiet title was not filed until the year 1946. 
Appellant, by her complaint alleges the fact that Katie 
C. Johnson died at Deer Lodge, Montana, during the month 
of August, 1919, leaving as her only heir at law, Alice 
Larson. 
This action is brought for the purpose of setting aside 
the judgment and decree quieting title to the property af-
fected by this action in Respondents Ross. Appellant pro· 
ceeds as administratrix of the estate of Katie C. Johnson, 
deceased (R. 35). Appellant further alleges that the tax 
title, upon which the judgment and decree quieting title in 
respondents to the property affected by this action, was 
defective in that no auditor's affidavit was attached to the 
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assessment rolls and therefore the estate of Katie C. 
Johnson, deceased had a meritorious defense to said action 
(R. 36). 
Respondents filed general and special demurrers to 
appellant's second complaint together with a motion w 
strike portions of appellant's complaint. The court sustain-
ed respondents' general demurrer, also the special demurrer 
to that part of paragraph 5 of the complaint reading as 
follows: 
"That the periodical in which said summons was pub-
lished, the South Salt Lake Herald was not a news-
paper having general circulation in Salt Lake County, 
and the same is a periodical least likely to give notice 
to defendant in said action and to the parties interested 
therein and not a periodical most likely to give notice 
of such action." ( R. 35) ( R. 42) 
and to appellant's paragraph 7, (R. 36 and 42). 
The court further granted respondents' motion to strike 
from paragraph 6 of the complaint, the following: 
"That plaintiff herein, through her agent, in using due 
diligence and in endeavoring to determine the where· 
abouts of Katie C. Johnson, the defendant in said action, 
made inquiry at the office of the City Police Department 
of Butte, Montana, the city in which said Katie C. 
1 ohnson resided for many years prior to her death, 
and the city shown by the records of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, in which said party resided and the city in which 
Mrs. R. E. Larson, the daughter of said Katie C. Johnson 
resided, the tax rolls of Salt Lake County reflecting the 
address of Katie C. Johnson as being in care of Mr. R. E. 
Larson, 702a West Park, Butte, Montana." (R. 35 and 
42) 
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II. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS 
Comes now the appellant and says that there is mani-
fest error in the records, proceedings and judgment entered 
in this cause in this, to-wit: 
( l) The court erred in sustaining respondents' general 
demurrer to appellant's complaint (R. 42), for the reason 
that said complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action agaist respondents and each of them. 
( 2) The court erred in sustaining resopndents' special 
demurrer, part II ( R. 38 & 42), for the reason that the 
allegations therein contained state with particularity the 
manner in which and the particulars claimed that the South 
Salt Lake Herald is not a newspaper having a general 
circulation in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
( 3) The court erred in sustaining respondents' special 
demurrer, par. III (R. 38 & 42) for the reason that it is 
not required that appellant state what the contents of the 
mail therein referred to was or when same was mailed, this 
inasmuch as appellant alleges the mail to have been that 
mailed by respondents and the contents and time of mail-
ing were within the knowledge of respondents. 
( 4) The court erred in granting respondents' motion to 
strike the allegations contained in the first nine lines of 
par. 6 of appellant's complaint and also the word "Montana" 
contained in line 10 of said par. 6 (R. 35 & 42), for the 
reason that said allegations expressly show why and where-
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in respondents failed to use due diligence In ascertaining 
the whereabouts of Katie C. Johnson. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
There being no bill of exceptions in this case, no trial 
having been had, and inasmuch as appellant's argument 
applies to each specification of error the specifications of 
error will not be separately argued. 
This action is a direct attack on the original judgment 
and not a collateral attack thereon. It is a suit in equity to 
have the original judgment declared null and void. 
The instant case does not come within that line of 
cases which are predicated on nonresidence of the defendant. 
Had defendent been living at the time process was attempted 
to be served, then we would have an entirely different case. 
Here we have a case in which process was attempted to be 
served against a deceased person. There is no statute in this 
state which permits process against a deceased person but 
on the contrary, the legislature of this state has made pro-
vision for proceeding in an action for the recovery of pos-
session of property against executors or administrators in 
all cases in which the same might have been maintained by 
or against their respective testators or intestates. (Sec. 102-
ll-5 UOA 1943). 
We say that due diligence was not exercised in the action 
through which title was decreed to be in respondents. Nei-
ther were the statutory requirements met by respondents in 
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that action in which default judgment was entered through 
publication of summons. 
It is clearly evident that the agent for respondents in 
the quiet title action made a useless search of records in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, as is stated was done, when it was 
evident from the source of inquiry that Katie C. Johnson 
was not and had not been a resident of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Such inquiry as it appears was made, was on its 
face useless and would avail respondents nothing whatsoever 
other than to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the fact 
that Katie C. Johnson was, at the time, deceased. 
Respondents did not use due dilligence in their efforts 
to locate Katie C. Johnson; that is, not the diligence contem-
plated by the Legislature in enacting the law on this subject. 
Due diligence could only have been shown by doing that 
which appellant did in determining the fact that Katie C. 
Johnson was deceased. The court never did obtain juri:5-
diction of Katie C. Johnson, or her representatives or heirs. 
That which respondents did in endeavoring to locate Katie 
C. Johnson did not meet the intent and spirit of the law. 
The Utah court has said in the case of Liebhart v. 
Lawrence, 40 Utah, 243 (259) that the law abhors and for-
bids the taking of property from a person without notice and 
without his day in court. 
In the Liebhart case supra. the court further say~ at 
page 261: 
"Non residents, as well as residents have a right to 
acquire and hold property in this state. In the absence 
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of proof of actual service, proceedings affecting their 
property require careful scrutiny; and the court, before 
entering a judgment taking it from them and giving it 
to another, should see to it that not only one, but that 
every requirement of the statute providing for a con-
structive service has, both in letter and spirit been strict-
ly complied with. The spirit and intent of the statute 
is . to give the non resident notice of the proceedings 
against or affecting his property, if that can be done." 
(Italics added). 
It is clearly evident from the language used in the 
above cited case, that the statute has not been complied with 
in letter and spirit simply by determining that the defendant 
was not a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. The respond-
ents were required to go further and to be diligent in mak-
mg their inquiries. 
In this argument, appellant is not unmindful of the fact 
that a distinction can be made in the facts of the Liebhart 
case and in those in the instant case to a certain extent. In 
the Liebhart case copies of the summons and complaint were 
not mailed nor attempted to be mailed by the plaintiff where-
as in the instant case mail was directed to Katie C. Johnson by 
the agent of respondents although it is not evident at this 
time whether the mail contained a copy of the summons and 
complaint or something else. Even if copies of the summons 
and complaint were enclosed the following dicta found in the 
Liebhart case at page 261 might be and we think will be 
applied in this case: 
"Here comes a litigant into court by a proceeding af-
fecting the property of a nonresident who for many 
years had the record title, except as his rights thereto 
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may have been divested by the tax sale, and seeks to take 
it from him, and to claim it for himself. He causes an 
affidavit to be filed by an agent that the nonresident 
'resides out of the State of Utah, and that his place of 
residence is to the affiant unknown,' without even stat-
ing that the place of such residence is unknown to the 
litigant. The clerk manifests no concern about it, and on 
the affidavit alone directs and causes the summons to 
be published, not in a 'newspaper designated as most 
likely to give notice to the person to be served', but in 
a weekly periodical least likely to give such notice. No 
effort and no inquiry is made to ascertain or to discover 
the place of plaintiff's residence. The fact of the place 
of residence was regarded as wholly immaterial, and 
that all that was necessary to know was that the plaintiff 
was a nonresident." 
It is to be noted that in the instant case neither the 
litigant nor his agent stated in the affidavit upon which the 
order for publication of summons was based that the place 
of residence of Katie C. Johnson is unknown to affiant or to 
the litigant. 
It is evident in the instant case as in the Liebhart 
case supra, the fact of the place of residence, and we might 
here add, whether defendant Katie C. Johnson was living 
or dead, was regarded as wholly immaterial, and that all 
that was necessary to know was that the defendant, Katie C. 
Johnson was a nonresident. 
The affidavit upon which the order for publication was 
made in the instant case does no more than to repeat the 
language or substance of the statute. This is not sufficient. 
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Said the court in the case of Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 
Cal. 149, cited by the Utah court in the Liebhart case: , 
'"An affidavit which merely repeats the language or 
substance of the statute is not sufficient. To hold that 
a bald repetition of the statute is sufficient is to strip 
the court or judge to whom the application is made of 
all judicial functions, and allow the party himself to 
determine in his own way the existence of jurisdictional 
facts-a practice too dangerous to the rights of de· 
fendants to admit of judicial toleration." 
It has further been held that an affidavit has no pro· 
bative force or evidentiary value when given by one who 
does not purport to have any knowledge of the fact deposed, 
either from _personal knowledge or from inquiry or investi-
gation. Such an affidavit is defective and is open to direct 
attack. 
See Liebhart v. Lawrence, supra. 
Bothell v. Hoellwarth, 10 S.D. 491, 74 N.W. 231, 
Nicoll v. Midland Svgs. L. Co. 21 Okla. 591, 96 Pac. 
744; 
McLaughlin v. McCann, 123 App. Div. 67, 107 N. Y. 
Supp. 762; 
Thompson v. Circuit Judge, 54 Mich. 236, 19 N. W. 
967; 
Mackubin v. Smith, 5 Minn. 367; 
Alderson v. Marshall, 7 Mont. 288, 16 Pae. 576; 
Noble v. Aune, 50 Wash. 73, 96 Pac. 688. 
We ask, what knowledge did affiant expect to ac-
quire, what knowledge could affiant acquire by making 
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